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he perception that companies in financial difficulties need 
to be preserved on behalf of social welfare (jobs and 
stimulation to the economic activity), nearly generating a 
state obligation to guarantee their survival at any cost, has given 
rise to excesses.  
The current legal device for judicial reorganization and 
bankruptcy (Law 11.101/2005) in force in Brazil enables 
maneuvers of companies which aim solely at having bankruptcy 
and execution claims against them suspended, taking advantage of 
the so-called stay period of 180 days. As an evidence of that, we 
cite the statistic of only 30% of concession of recoveries in view 
of the total of requests1. That is, for every ten filings of judicial 
reorganizations, only three undergo the scrutiny of Article 58 of 
the Judicial Reorganization Law. The vast majority fails to present 
their reorganization plan or has the plan rejected by the creditors’ 
meeting.  
On the other hand, it is seen that the corporate reorganization 
mechanism often does not allow for an effective processing of 
the reorganization plan, failing to encourage a healthy relationship 
between those involved and leading viable enterprises to 
bankruptcy.  One cannot suppose that the creditors, just for being 
responsible for the plan approval, must necessarily do so 
consciously. Besides leaving little or no margin for the creditors 
to present alternative plans, bankruptcy is put as the immediate 
consequence of the non-approval at the meeting. In the first case, 
the creditors fail to suggest broad changes to the plan or lack the 
necessary information for an alternative. In the second situation, 
in turn, the creditor’s options are greatly reduced. Either he votes 
for the approval of any plan - even perceiving its evident 
inconsistency - or he will face the certain loss for the debtor’s 
bankruptcy (COELHO, 2018).  
Thus, even if there is good intention by the debtor, the creditors 
are susceptible to an innocuous meeting and to an often-
inconsistent plan. In this scenario, according to Oliveira (2015), 
the operators of this important company recovery mechanism 
find rates of only 5% of closure of the judicial lawsuit for 
                                               
1 Serasa Experian Bankruptcy and Recovery Indicator: Total monthly survey of required 
judicial reorganization, both deferred and granted. Division of total concessions 2,713 
by the total requirements 8,884 in the period from Jan/09-Feb/18. 
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compliance with the plan. Besides cases in which the stir drags on 
for several years ahead of the stipulated by the legislation. 
In order to digest the flaws of the current corporate recovery 
mechanism, suggestions for the adequacy of Law 11.101/05 are 
widely discussed in the legal, political, corporate and academic 
environment, in order to assert to society, the costly judicial 
recovery process. The expectation is that the recovery institute in 
Brazil may have its version updated. This may provide higher 
effectiveness, both from the point of view of the recovery of the 
debts inserted in the lawsuit, of the time and necessary costs2, as 
well as of the greater control and criterion for the deferral of 
requests at the time of the initial appeal. 
To have an idea of the importance of discussing the efficiency of 
the recovery processes, member countries of the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) have the 
average cost of judicial reorganization operations at 9.1% of the 
total assets of the debtor3. That is, it is indeed a tremendous effort 
on the part of everyone involved, to have such an operation 
unanswered for years.  
In Brazil, the legislation reform in 2005 mainly aimed at 
increasing the amount of debts paid by firms which entered the 
bankruptcy process. At the time of the legislative amendment, the 
creditors of firms undergoing judicial reorganization were facing a 
rate of only 0.2% recovery of their assets. In comparison, at the 
same time, creditors in the United States recovered their assets at 
a rate of 80.2%, in China at a rate of 31.7% and in India 24.6% 4 
(PONTICELLI; ALENCAR, 2006).  
Law 11.101/2005 brought an undeniable improvement to the 
asset recovery environment. Two of the major improvements 
presented by the current legislation were: (i) greater ease of sale of 
firms undergoing judicial reorganization through the exclusion of 
purchaser’s responsibility (Articles 60 and 141); (ii) alteration in 
the order of payments, with a limit for the labor claims, and the 
position of credits with real guarantee by the taxpayers (article 
83).  
Already in the first years of validity, the new legislation provided 
an increase in the asset recovery rate5 for something around 12%, 
such a leap in the effectiveness of the recovery system. Over the 
years, however, the performance of the Brazilian judicial 
reorganization system under the aegis of Law 11.101/2005 has 
been proven weak. It has been found, in the World Bank’s Doing 
                                               
2 According a study by the World Bank, Doing Business - Resolving Insolvency, in 
Brazil, the necessary time for the creditors to recover their credit is four years, on 
average, and the cost of the procedure is 12% of the value of the debtor’s property. 
Both indicators are above the average of the world’s leading economies (1.7 and 9.1%, 
respectively). 
3 World Bank – Doing Business Studies, Resolving Insolvency (2017). Available at 
<http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploretopics/resolving-insolvency>  
4 “Court Enforcement, Bank Loans and Firm Investment: Evidence from a Bankruptcy 
Reform in Brazil”. Working Paper No. 425. Central Bank of Brazil. 
5 The recovery rate is recorded as the portion recovered by secured creditors through 
judicial reorganization, settlement or debt execution proceedings. 
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Business report that, despite an encouraging performance in the 
early years, the new system did not have the strength to take off, 
and fell far short of the other countries.  
As a form of analysis, Figure 1 presents the historical 
performance of the asset recovery rate in Brazil, compared to 
countries with similar economic activity6 (Comparison Base), as 
well as of the more developed OECD countries. The result is a 
clear difference between the Brazilian system and the rest of the 
world. While the countries with activity similar to ours and the 
most developed ones nowadays recover, respectively, 37% and 
72% of the assets involved in a judicial reorganization, Brazil is at 
a much lower level, close to 18% over the past few years. 
 
Figure 1: Asset Recovery Rate 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration with data from the World Bank – Doing Business Report 
 
Figure 2: Dispersion of the asset recovery rate with 




Source: Author’s elaboration with data from the World Bank – Doing Business Report 
 
Clearly, the longer the period under judicial reorganization 
(horizontal axis), the lower the amount of recovered debt (vertical 
axis). Therefore, the hypothesis that judicial reorganizations take 
                                               
6 We call this group Comparison Base, which is formed by countries which have a 
Gross Domestic Product at levels close to the Brazilian ones. Among others, Mexico, 
Russia, China, South Africa, Argentina, Peru and Turkey are considered here. 
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time for good use of the process to be made and debts to be paid 
is excluded. The delay is mere procrastination by opportunists or 
inefficiency of a system still without a practical result. 
In Brazil, as occurred with the asset recovery rate, the average 
time of legal reorganizations was significantly improved with the 
institution of the new company reorganization law in 2005. 
However, once again the improvement was not sufficient. Still 
based on the excellent study annually elaborated by the World 
Bank, the Doing Business report, Brazil moved from an average 
duration of judicial reorganizations from 10 to 4 years7 after the 
new legislation. That is still distant from the average of countries 
such as the United States (1 year), China (1.7), Japan (0.6), 
Argentina (2.4), Russia (2) and Italy (1.8).  
In addition to learning that the delay in the bankruptcy process 
greatly jeopardizes the effectiveness of asset recovery, it has also 
been determined that it drastically increases its cost to society, 
especially to the debtor. Figure 3 illustrates that processes with 
longer duration present higher costs necessary for the recovery of 
assets8, indicating that inefficiency is contagious, as the longer the 
process, the more expensive and less effective it becomes. 
 
Figure 3: Dispersion of the cost of the judicial 
reorganization process with respective duration in 74 
economies 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration with data from the World Bank – Doing Business Report 
 
The suggestions for the reform of law 11.101/2005, the Law on 
Judicial and Extrajudicial Reorganization and Bankruptcy, come 
from diverse sectors. In order for the bill, altering the current 
legislation, to contemplate different opinions of society, the 
                                               
7 The time period measured by the World Bank’s Doing Business report spans from the 
company’s reorganization request until payment of part, or all the money owed to the 
bank. Potential delay tactics by the parties, such as delaying appeals or requests for 
extension, are taken into account.  
8 The cost of the process is recorded as a percentage of the value of the debtor’s equity, 
and includes judicial costs and government fees; administrators’, auctioneers’, advisors’ 
and attorneys’ fees; and all other fees and costs. World Bank - Doing Business Studies , 
Resolving Insolvency (2017). Available at 
<http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploretopics/resolving-insolvency >. 
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Ministry of Finance created, at the end of 2016, a work group 
composed by 21 professionals.  
The first point that deserves highlighting among the proposals for 
modernization of the Brazilian bankruptcy environment refers to 
the competent court to conduct the proceeding. Nowadays, 
incredibly complex proceedings and supported by an 
entanglement of economic-financial situations are under the 
responsibility of unprepared judges and without any experience in 
the subject.  
Article 3 of the law in force establishes that the competent court 
is that of the location of the debtor’s main place of business. The 
draft amendment suggests, in § 1 of the same article, that in cases 
of judicial reorganization or bankruptcy with liabilities higher than 
three hundred thousand (300,000) minimum wages, on the date 
of filing, will be competent to the court of the state capital or the 
Federal District in which the main establishment is located. It 
further reinforces that this guideline must be followed until the 
Courts of Justice program specialized regional courts.  
Another important theme under discussion is the so-called prior 
investigation. In sum, the aim is the opportunity for utilization of 
accounting information to avoid the deferral of the reorganization 
process to economically infeasible companies, and to identify 
settlement processes in which the collected assets are insufficient 
to reimburse the creditors (JUPETIPE, 2017).  
The financing of the debtor during the judicial reorganization is 
also remembered in the modernization suggestions of the law. 
Today, a company in bitter judicial reorganization, besides the 
delicate situation of having its survival challenged, an incredible 
difficulty to obtain new financing, an unforgivable gap of the 
current legislation. It is as if someone, even after being rescued 
from drowning, is deprived of vital oxygen.  
Section IV-A of bill 10220/2018, which includes articles 69-A to 
69-I, allows the debtor to enter into financing agreements, 
including those secured by encumbrance or alienation of assets 
and rights, theirs or third parties’, to finance their restructuring 
activities. In case of bankruptcy of the debtor, the amount of the 
funding effectively delivered to the debtor during the judicial 
reorganization will be considered exempt from bankruptcy and 
will confer preference to the lender (except in cases where the 
lender is a partner or relative up to the fourth degree). Thus, great 
progress in the success rates in judicial reorganizations is 
expected, recovering the confidence of the entrepreneurs and, 
consequently, heating up the economy. 
Besides the aforementioned alterations, others are still being 
proposed and will require intense debate within the legislative 
branch, aiming at the due measurement of the aid each one of 
them will bring to the recovery environment. Bringing the 
spotlight to the discussion about the current process of judicial 
reorganization in Brazil is of fundamental importance, for the 
tragic consequence of continuing with an inefficient recovery 
mechanism. Several business opportunities are being lost, capital 
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is deteriorating, and jobs are being lost, while huge amounts of 
resources are spent on lawsuits, mostly innocuous and time-
consuming. The uncertainties which bring about an ineffective 
judicial reorganization process generate, besides distress to the 
affected parties (workers, creditors and debtors), irreversible 
losses to the productive chain. 
 The business reorganization tool is put into disrepute 
when its crooked utilization is allowed, both from the point of 
view of the debtor and of the creditor. Sometimes, there is an 
attempt to utilize the institute with the intention of merely 
procrastinating an inevitable bankruptcy and defrauding the 
creditors. Also, events in which the creditors’ hostile 
performance, acting deceitfully and truculently, directs the 
process towards an undue liquidation direction, are not 
uncommon. In both cases, society as a whole loses, due to the 
contamination of the important recovery environment.  
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